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Abstract
A large-scale multiple surveillance system for infectious disease outbreaks has been in
operation in England and Wales since the early 1990s. Changes to the statistical algorithm
at the heart of the system were proposed and the purpose of this paper is to compare two
new algorithms with the original algorithm. Test data to evaluate performance are created
from weekly counts of the number of cases of each of more than 2000 diseases over a
twenty-year period. The time series of each disease is separated into one series giving the
baseline (background) disease incidence and a second series giving disease outbreaks.
One series is shifted forward by twelve months and the two are then recombined, giving a
realistic series in which it is known where outbreaks have been added. The metrics used to
evaluate performance include a scoring rule that appropriately balances sensitivity against
specificity and is sensitive to variation in probabilities near 1. In the context of disease sur-
veillance, a scoring rule can be adapted to reflect the size of outbreaks and this was done.
Results indicate that the two new algorithms are comparable to each other and better than
the algorithm they were designed to replace.
1 Introduction
Many public health bodies tasked with surveillance of infectious diseases use statistical surveil-
lance systems to process large quantities of data in order to detect emerging outbreaks and, if
appropriate, implement control measures. For England and Wales, a laboratory-based report-
ing system has been the mechanism for national and regional surveillance of infectious dis-
eases, with laboratory reports collated at the centre in London. The centre was called the
Health Protection Agency (HPA) until 2013, when it became part of Public Health England
(PHE). For more than twenty years the HPA/PHE used an algorithm reported in [1] to analyse
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these data and identify outbreaks, but work to improve the algorithm was recently undertaken
and several modifications proposed [2].
The purpose of this paper is to compare the performances of two new forms of the algo-
rithm with that of the original algorithm. Key features for an effective comparison are:
1. test data that reflects reality;
2. appropriate metrics for evaluating performance.
The primary novel features of this paper are the method of constructing test data and a scor-
ing rule that is tailored to the task of comparing outbreak surveillance systems. The methods
may be used in the evaluation of a wide variety of surveillance methods when long time series
of disease counts are available.
To compare the algorithms, we are fortunate in having extensive data from PHE: weekly
counts of the number of cases of each of more than 2000 infectious diseases over a twenty-year
period, from 1991-2011. However, exploiting these data is not straightforward. With large out-
breaks it may not be clear in which week an outbreak started or exactly when it ended. With
minor abberations, it will not be known whether a slightly high value was an outbreak or
whether it simply resulted from random variation. To emphasize this latter point, suppose
there is a small spike in the number of cases of a disease in one particular week. One surveil-
lance method, Method A, flags an outbreak for this week while another method, Method B,
does not. Does this result suggest that Method A is better than Method B, or vice-versa? We
cannot answer the question unless we know whether an outbreak really occurred in that week.
Moreover, differentiating between the performances of the methods will involve situations
where it is tricky to decide whether an outbreak occurred, as that is when methods are most
likely to disagree and hence be separable. Similar problems arise when methods disagree as to
when an outbreak started or ended.
Nevertheless, basing test data on real data is clearly desirable, especially as the time series for
the occurrences of real diseases take extremely diverse patterns, as examples given later will
illustrate. Simulated data that is generated solely from a mathematical model will not fully rep-
licate the variety of time series that can occur, some of which have bizarre patterns or features.
The approach we adopt is to take the time series of real data for each disease and separate it
into two series, one giving the baseline (background) disease incidence and the other the dis-
ease outbreaks. The separation will not be perfect, but each should be a reasonable reflection of
reality for the disease. We then shift one series forward by twelve months so as to destroy the
close dependence between the two series at each time point, while respecting seasonal effects.
The two series are then added together to form a realistic series in which we know where out-
breaks have been added.
This method of constructing test time series of infectious disease data has not been proposed
before. The closest related work is that of [3], [4] and [5], who each inject artificial outbreaks
into time series of real surveillance data. Their aim is to evaluate surveillance methods for the
fast detection of large disease outbreaks caused by bio-terrorism, which is a different context
to the one we consider. In particular, outbreaks caused by bio-terrorism are rare, so past data
can be equated to baseline (outbreak-free) data and, from lack of real data, the outbreaks they
injected into time series had to be predominantly artificial.
A number of criteria have been proposed for evaluating the performance of outbreak detec-
tion systems; reviews may be found in [6] and [7]. It is commonly recommended that a variety
of evaluation criteria should be examined to see if a surveillance method is fit for purpose [8].
Here the criteria we shall examine reflect specificity, sensitivity, time before an outbreak is
detected, and the number of cases before detection. As specificity can easily be improved at the
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cost of poorer sensitivity, or vice-versa, combined measures that balance specificity against sen-
sitivity are needed. ROC curves and related curves have been used for this purpose, but a sepa-
rate curve would be needed for each infectious disease being monitored, and here there are a
large number of diseases.
Instead, we propose the use of a scoring rule that is based on the probabilities that a surveil-
lance method gives for ‘outbreak’ and ‘no outbreak’ each week. A novel feature of the scoring rule
is that it reflects the number of cases that have been observed, giving greater weight to higher
counts, regardless of whether or not there was an outbreak that week. In practice, this means that
missing a large outbreak is generally penalised more than missing a small outbreak. This seems
appropriate, as missing a large outbreak tends to have more adverse consequences. Also, a surveil-
lance algorithmmust sometimes miss very small outbreaks if it is to have reasonable specificity.
An important question is how to strike a balance between specificity and sensitivity. One
way of partially answering this question is to consider the situation where the time series of dis-
ease occurrences is generated from a mathematical model. Then, given the data for the current
week and preceding weeks, we could know, in principle, the true probability each week of ‘out-
break’ and ‘no outbreak’. A surveillance system that consistently matches these probabilities
should expect to get a better score than a system that does not match these probabilities. By
definition this will be the case if, and only if, the scoring rule is strictly proper. The scoring rule
we use is strictly proper, so the expected score is maximised by giving probabilities that mirror
reality. The purpose of the surveillance algorithms is to monitor a large number of diseases
to detect which of them, if any, display signs of an outbreak. From this perspective, the only
results of interest are those that suggest an outbreak is likely or highly likely to have arisen. Our
chosen scoring rule reflects this purpose; it is asymmetric and discriminates far more between
probabilities in the range 0.95–1 than in the range 0–0.9. To our knowledge, this is the first use
of a proper scoring rule that is targeted to a small section of the probability range.
In Section 2 we briefly describe the outlier detection algorithms examined in this paper. In
Section 3 we describe the test data used for evaluation and the procedure for deriving it from
the historical time series. The motivation for the procedure and its benefits are discussed. The
evaluation criteria used to compare the performance of algorithms are given in Section 4.
These include the novel scoring rule. Results from the comparison of algorithms are presented
in Section 5 and some concluding comments are made in Section 6.
2 The outbreak detection algorithms
We shall refer to the original algorithm proposed by [1] as the HPA algorithm because of its
long-term use by the HPA. [2] examined the effects of their proposed modifications using sim-
ulated data generated from a mathematical model. Based on the results, two modified algo-
rithms were proposed and applied to real data. These are the two other algorithms that we
examine here. Following Noufaily et al., we refer to these as the quasi-Poisson algorithm and
the negative binomial algorithm.
The purpose of each algorithm is to provide an exceedance score (X) for each disease, where
this is defined as
X ¼ y0  bm0
U  bm0 : ð1Þ
In this equation, y0 is the number of cases of the disease in the current week, bm0 is its
expected value, and U is a threshold value such that Pr(y0> U) approximately equals some
small value, α say, if there is no outbreak of the disease in the current week. (Typically α is set
equal to 0.005 or, less commonly, 0.025.) Diseases with X 1 are ﬂagged for more detailed
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investigation and a list is produced that ranks the ﬂagged diseases in the order given by their
exceedance scores. For each disease, the algorithms also produce a p-value from a hypothesis
test that there is no outbreak of the disease in the current week.
The algorithms all fit a weighted quasi-Poisson model to a time series of counts of disease
cases over the preceding five years, allow the expected count to follow a linear trend over time
with seasonal variation, and down-weight counts that are unusually high as the aim is to model
the underlying baseline (outbreak-free) time series. Some details are given in Appendix A and
further detail may be found in [1] and [2].
The only difference between the negative-binomial algorithm and the quasi-Poisson algo-
rithm is that the former uses a negative binomial distribution to calculate the threshold U while
the latter (and also the HPA algorithm) use a normal approximation. The differences between
the HPA algorithm and these other two algorithms are greater. The HPA algorithm only
includes a linear time trend if there is evidence that there is a trend and uses different criteria
for down-weighting past values that are high. Also, to handle seasonality it restricts the data it
uses from any year to a seven-week window centred on the current week, while the other algo-
rithms use the full data and model seasonality using a 10-level factor. From its original design,
the HPA algorithm does not flag a disease as a potential outbreak unless the total count in the
past four weeks exceeds 4. Noufaily et al. considered forms of negative-binomial and the quasi-
Poisson algorithms that adopted this policy and those are the forms used here, as small isolated
counts of a very rare disease should not, in general, be flagged as aberrant. (Although any case
of certain dangerous diseases always requires investigation.)
3 The test data
From the simulation study that they conducted, Noufaily et al. concluded that the false-positive
rate given by the HPA algorithm is too high, primarily due to excessive down-weighting of
high baseline values and reliance of too few baseline weeks. They applied the algorithms of
interest here to real data from PHE for the year 2011 and found that the two modified algo-
rithms flagged high values at a much lower rate than the HPA algorithm. However, the speci-
ficity and sensitivity of algorithms could not be determined because of the limitations of using
real data: the precise occurrences and sizes of outbreaks are not known. Here we start with his-
torical time series of real disease counts and from them construct realistic time series in which
the details of outbreaks are known.
The data are from PHE for the years 1991-2011 and relate to 3,303 distinct types of infec-
tious organism whose occurrence frequencies range across six orders of magnitude. These data
have been analysed by [9], who examine its characteristics and note a diversity of seasonal pat-
terns, trends, artifacts and extra-Poisson variation. Following [9], data from the last 26 weeks
of 2011 will not be used so as to mitigate the effects of delays in data processing at the end of
the series. (Reporting delays are an issue with laboratory data of the form available to us. Meth-
ods to incorporate the effects of reporting delays in statistical surveillance systems have been
the subject of separate research [10]). Some organisms that were identified towards the end of
the study period would not have been identified by the tests that were performed a decade or
so earlier. In line with Enki et al., all leading sequences of zeros are recoded as missing values
and, to reduce the selection bias this introduces, the first non-zero count is reduced by one.
There are 999 diseases for which there are less than eight years data and these are omitted from
our analysis, reducing the number we examine to 2304.
The diversity in the time series of different diseases is illustrated in Fig 1, where plots of the
weekly counts for five selected organisms are given. The organisms vary considerably in their
weekly counts, with plot (a) (Streptococcus coagulase negative) showing counts that sometimes
Comparison of Statistical Algorithms for the Detection of Infectious Disease Outbreaks
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Fig 1. Time series for selected organisms.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0160759.g001
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exceed 600, while the counts in plot (b) (Schistosoma haematobium) never exceed 10. Shapes
also vary. Plot (a) shows a clear trend, plot (b) is flat with a number of one-week spikes, plot (c)
(Salmonella enteritidis PT21) shows marked seasonality and plot (d) (Campylobacter coli) and
plot (e) (Acinetobacter SP) show both seasonality and trend.
The following steps were followed for each organism to separate its time series of weekly
counts into one time series of baseline data (series A) and another of outbreaks (series B). The
procedure is iterative and starts with A equated to the observed time series, {yi, i = 1, 2, . . .},
where yi is the count in week ti for the organism of current interest.
Step 1. As noted in Section 2, none of the three algorithms will flag a disease as a potential
outbreak unless at least five cases of the disease have been reported in the past four weeks. In
line with this, the time series is examined to see whether it includes at least one sequence of
four weeks in which there were five or more cases of the disease. If not, then the series will not
help differentiate between the algorithms, so it is omitted from all analyses and no further steps
are performed for it.
Step 2. A generalised linear model (GLM) or generalised additive model (GAM) is fitted to
A using the mgcv package in R. In either case, a quasi-Poisson model with a log link function is
used and a seasonal covariate factor is included if there is evidence (at the 5% significance
level) that its inclusion improves model-fit. The seasonal factor has 12 levels, one for each
month. A GLM is fitted if there is no evidence (at the 5% significance level) of a linear trend
over time; otherwise a GAM with a smoothed time trend is fitted. Output from the GLM or
GAM includes fitted values giving the weekly expected disease counts and an estimate of the
dispersion parameter, ϕ, that is constrained to b  1. The time series in A is long (weekly
counts over at least an 8-year period) and the models are not complex, so the risk of overﬁtting
is small and any overﬁtting would have little effect.
Step 3. We next determine whether any weekly counts in A should be classified as extreme.
Let yi denote the value in A for week ti. [Unless the original value in A for week ti has been
replaced (c.f. step 4), yi ¼ yi.] The underlying base rate for that week is taken as the expected
count, bm i, and if there is no outbreak, an estimate of the variance of the count is bbm i.
Any weekly count of two or less is classified as ‘not extreme’. For other weeks:
1. We first classify yi as extreme if it exceeds bmi þ 2ðbbmiÞ1=2.
2. For each of the weeks whose counts are ‘extreme’, we check if the counts of the adjacent
weeks are also extreme, but use less stringent criteria because outbreaks commonly last
more than a week. We classify yi as extreme if its value exceeds bmi þ 1:5ðbbmiÞ1=2 and it is
next to a value that is extreme.
Although extreme values may arise from a number of reasons, we refer to them collectively
as ‘outbreaks’ because they should all be flagged by outbreak detection algorithms, whose aim
is to detect cases of a disease that are not part of the baseline series.
Step 4. We note the weeks in which values have been classified as extreme. They are then
dropped from A and replaced. If yi is dropped, it is replaced with a random value from a nega-
tive binomial distribution with mean bm i and variance bbm i, under the constraint that the new
value must be less than bm i þ 1:5ðbbm iÞ1=2.
Step 5. We then return to step 2 and repeatedly cycle through steps 2–4 until step 3 identifies
none of the values in A as extreme.
Step 6. When this step is reached, series A contains the final estimate of the baseline data.
The difference in weekly values between the real data and A gives B, our weekly time series of
outbreaks.
Comparison of Statistical Algorithms for the Detection of Infectious Disease Outbreaks
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An R program used in the implementation of the above steps is provided as supporting
information [S1 R.Codes].
Fig 2 takes the time series shown in Fig 1 and separates each of them into series A and series
B. The lighter (grey) line in each plot is A and the non-zero values in B are shown by the darker
(red) lines. The black line shows the baseline expected counts when there is no outbreak. The
baseline is meant to follow any trend or seasonality in series A and in the plots it appears to do
this well.
We want time series in which we know where outbreaks have occurred. One approach is to
simulate outbreaks from a mathematical model and add them to series A, so that the baseline
incidence mirrors reality. Another approach is to add series B to baseline data simulated from a
mathematical model, so that the outbreak data mirrors reality. With both these approaches, the
outbreaks and baseline data are independent so it is clear that outbreaks have been injected
into a baseline. Also, we know when outbreaks have been injected and their sizes.
In contrast, the following criticisms are valid if we simply add A to B to form the test time
series.
1. Independent outbreak data have not been injected into baseline data. Rather, the original
data series has simply been reconstructed.
2. The method of identifying extreme counts (so as to form B) uses only slightly more infor-
mation than the outbreak detection algorithms being tested. (They only differ as to whether
future data are used to decide if the count in the week of current interest is extreme.) Conse-
quently, when this method and, say, the HPA algorithm disagree as to whether a count in a
particular week is extreme, it is not clear which should be taken as correct. That is, we do
not know when outbreaks have occurred with sufficient certainty.
Nevertheless, using A to model baseline incidence and B to model outbreaks is attractive, as
this makes full use of the data. The solution that we adopt is to shift B forward by one year, giv-
ing a new series (series C say) that has the same annual timing of any seasonal pattern that was
present in B. We then create the series of test data by adding A to C for the 19.5 years where
these two time series overlap. The relationship between contemporaneous elements of C and A
is weak (the element in C is from the previous year), so it is reasonable to treat the addition of
C to A as the injection of outbreaks into unrelated baseline data. Weeks in which C is non-zero
are classified as the weeks in which outbreaks occur. As long as A is a realistic representation of
a baseline weekly disease count and B is a realistic sequence of outbreaks of the disease, then
A + C should be a realistic time series on which to test outbreak detection algorithms. More-
over, we have more information about the occurrence of outbreaks than is available to the algo-
rithms under test. In particular, we can be certain that outbreaks have been injected in those
weeks where the count in the test data is higher than in the real data. This covers the great
majority of classified outbreaks: the count is higher in the test data in 94% of the weeks for
which series C is non-zero.
Fig 3 shows the test series given by A + C for each of the diseases considered in Figs 1 and 2.
The lighter (grey) line shows the baseline counts given by series A and the darker (red) lines
show the injected outbreaks given by series C. In each plot their combination (A + C) looks as if
the corresponding time series in Fig 1 has simply been moved along by 12 months. Thus A + C
does give realistic time series of disease counts. The darker (red) lines are fairly sparse so C has
non-zero values for comparatively few weeks. Thus most of the counts in Fig 1 have not been
moved up 12 months to form Fig 3—this only appears to be the case because the eye-catching
features (the outbreaks) have been identified and translated by 12 months. Thus the time series
in Fig 3 meet the requirements of being realistic with outbreaks that have been injected.
Comparison of Statistical Algorithms for the Detection of Infectious Disease Outbreaks
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Fig 2. Time-series separated into baseline (grey line) and outbreaks (darker/red lines) for selected
organisms; continuous black line shows the baseline expected counts when there is no outbreak.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0160759.g002
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Fig 3. The test series for selected organisms showing the baseline (grey line) and injected outbreaks
(darker/red lines).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0160759.g003
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4 Evaluation measures
4.1 Standard Metrics
Algorithms were applied to the test data of each organism and they classified the count in each
week as extreme/not extreme, which we equate to outbreak/no outbreak. The following metrics
will be used to evaluate an algorithm’s performance. They relate to specificity, sensitivity and
timeliness.
False positive rate (FPR). This is the proportion of weeks in which a count was flagged as
extreme but, in fact, there was no outbreak. A low FPR corresponds to good specificity.
Probability of detection (POD). Each sequence of weeks in which series C has non-zero val-
ues defines the timing of one outbreak. An outbreak is deemed to be detected if the algorithm
flags a count as extreme at least once during the outbreak’s duration. POD is the proportion of
outbreaks that are detected; a high POD corresponds to good sensitivity.
Scaled probability of detection (ScPOD). From a practical viewpoint, missing large outbreaks
matters more than missing small outbreaks. This metric reflects the proportion of outbreaks
detected and their sizes. Let nj denote the number of cases in the jth outbreak (obtained from
C). Suppose there are N outbreaks and that the algorithm detected the jth outbreak if j 2 J,
where J is a set of positive integers. We define the scaled probability of detection as
ScPOD ¼ Pj2Jnj=PNj¼1 nj: ð2Þ
Average time before detection (ATBD). For a specified set of N outbreaks, this is the average
number of weeks between an outbreak starting and its detection (excluding the week of detec-
tion). The set of outbreaks will consist of outbreaks of specified sizes but will exclude outbreaks
that were not detected. Letmj denote the number of weeks before an outbreak’s detection,
where j 2 J ifmj relates to an outbreak in the set. Then
ATBD ¼ Pj2Jmj =N: ð3Þ
The overall ATBD is the ATBD for the set of all outbreaks that were detected. A good algo-
rithm will not only detect a large proportion of outbreaks (which POD and ScPOD measure),
but will also detect them quickly, which this metric measures.
Relative size before detection (RSBD). The timeliness of a surveillance system also depends
on the number of outbreak cases that occur before an outbreak is detected. To obtain a measure
that is not dominated by common diseases, we relate this number to baseline values. Let vj
denote the number of cases in the jth outbreak during the weeks before its detection (given by
series C) and let uj denote the number of baseline cases during those weeks (given by series A).
If uj equates to an average of less than two cases per week, we increase it so that it equals two
cases per week, so that uncommon diseases do not have a disproportionate affect. We define
the relative size before detection as
RSBD ¼ Pj2J ðvj=ujÞ=N: ð4Þ
4.2 A Tailored Scoring Rule
Scoring rules gained prominence in the context of weather forecasting. For some daily forecasts
of whether it will rain, meteorologists gave a “probability of precipitation” and scoring rules
were used to evaluate the accuracy of these probabilities. One purpose of a scoring rule is to
encourage honesty. A scoring rule is said to be proper if a person can maximize his (or her)
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expectation of his score by reporting his true beliefs and it is said to be strictly proper if a person
can onlymaximize his expectation of his score by reporting his true beliefs.
A scoring rule should be proper if it is to play a role in evaluating surveillance methods for
disease outbreaks. To illustrate this, we consider a scoring rule that is not proper, though at
first sight it seems a sensible rule. Specifically, suppose that, when a surveillance method esti-
mates pi as the probability of an outbreak in week ti, then its score is given by:
score ¼
pi if an outbreak has occurred
1 pi if no outbreak has occurred:
ð5Þ
(
This is called the linear scoring rule. It seems a reasonable rule as it assigns a score equal to
the estimated probability of the event that occurred.
Now suppose we are comparing two surveillance methods that calculate each week the
probability that an outbreak has occurred. Suppose pi is a realistic estimate of this probability
in week ti. (In a simulation study we could calculate pi , as the mechanism for generating the
number of cases in a week is known.) Suppose further that one surveillance method always esti-
mates pi accurately while the second method is biased and gives probabilities that are too
extreme: when pi > 0:5 the probability it gives is greater than p

i while, when p

i < 0:5, the
probability it gives is less than pi . Clearly a decent scoring rule should give a better long-term
average score to the accurate surveillance method, rather than the biased method. However, if
a surveillance method gives pi as the probability of an outbreak in week ti, then the expected
score that it receives from the linear scoring rule, E(Si) say, is
EðSiÞ ¼ pi pi þ ð1 pi Þð1 piÞ: ð6Þ
As dEðSiÞ=dpi ¼ 2pi  1, it follows that the biased surveillance method has a higher
expected score than the accurate method, both when pi > 0:5 and when p

i < 0:5. This is
clearly inappropriate and is the type of error that cannot arise with a proper scoring rule: with
a proper scoring rule, by deﬁnition, the expected score is maximized by setting pi equal to pi , as
that is the realistic (honest) estimate of the probability of an outbreak.
Strictly proper scoring rules provide a natural balance between sensitivity and specificity.
When there is an outbreak in week ti, a large value of pi corresponds to good sensitivity and
yields a good score. When no outbreak has occurred, a low value of pi corresponds to good
specificity and this also yields a good score. If it is strictly proper, the scoring rule ensures that
the expected score is maximised by giving a realistic value to pi at each time point, thus balanc-
ing the contrasting needs for good sensitivity (set pi high) and good specificity (set pi low).
The most common scoring rules are the logarithmic, quadratic and spherical rules. These
are not well-suited to the present context because we require a scoring rule that is insensitive to
values of pi in the range 0 to 0.9, and very sensitive to variation in pi in the range 0.95 to 1—
when a disease has a value of pi in the former range (below 0.9), no action will be taken to
investigate whether there is an outbreak of the disease (unless the seriousness of a disease
means that all occurrences are investigated), while the impetus to investigate increases substan-
tially as pi increases from 0.95 to 1. A flexible choice of scoring rules is based on the family of
beta distributions [11]:
score ¼
giF1ðpiÞ if an outbreak occurred in week ti
gif1 F2ðpiÞg if no outbreak occurred in week ti;
ð7Þ
(
where F1 and F2 are the cumulative distribution functions of beta(a, b + 1) and beta(a + 1, b)
probability distributions, respectively, and gi does not inﬂuence pi. The scoring rule is
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asymmetric if a 6¼ b and strictly proper for any a, b> −1 [12]. Here we set a = 40 and b = 0.5.
Table 1 lists the scores that this rule gives for a variety of values of pi when gi = 1. It can be
seen that all values of pi 2 (0, 0.9) give similar scores, while scores change substantially as pi
increases from 0.95 to 1.0. The occurrence of an outbreak (rather than no occurrence) only
gives the higher score when p exceeds 0.985. If an alarm should be sounded when an outbreak
has likely occurred, then sounding it for values of p above 0.985 might make a suitable thresh-
old, as the alarm should only be raised when there is clear evidence that an outbreak has
occurred.
In judging the performance of algorithms, the most important weeks are those when the
count of an organism is noticeably higher than usual for the time of year. Those are the weeks
in which an algorithm might incorrectly flag an outbreak when one has not occurred, or when
one algorithm might correctly flag an outbreak while another algorithm does not. Also, if a
large outbreak has occurred, we would like it to be flagged very clearly. In contrast, missing
very small outbreaks (perhaps of just two or three cases) seems inevitable if the false discovery
rate is to be kept low, so missing large outbreaks should be penalised more. Thus, in Eq (7) we
want gi to reflect the size of an outbreak while
1. gi should not equal 0 when there is no outbreak—weeks with no outbreak are less important
but not unimportant.
2. The value of gi should give no information about outbreaks that is not readily available to
the outbreak detection algorithm. This is necessary for the validity of the scoring rule—oth-
erwise it might be possible to improve an algorithm (when judged by expected score) by
exploiting the value of gi.
To illustrate the relevance of (b), note that the scoring rule would be proper if gi took a ran-
domly generated value, even if that value varied from week to week. The scoring rule would
still be proper if gi were set equal to yi, the number of cases in the current week, as that informa-
tion is available to the outbreak detection algorithms (and used by them). However, some
choices of gi could change an algorithm’s optimal approach to estimating pi. As an extreme
example, if gi were set equal to the size of the outbreak in the current week, equalling 0 when
there is no outbreak, then setting pi equal to 1 for all imaximises the expected score.
The approach we advocate is to set gi equal to max[0, (yi − ηi)
1/2], where ηi is a low estimate
of the baseline count for week i. In implementing the scoring rule, we take the corresponding
week in each of the previous five years and set ηi equal to the smallest number of cases in any
one of those weeks. (For example, if week ti is the first week of August 2011, then ηi is taken as
the smallest number of cases in the first week of August in the years 2006 to 2010). Thus gi is
proportional to the square-root of a high estimate of the outbreak size. This gives greater
importance to large outbreaks, while gi will usually also be non-zero in weeks without outbreak.
Table 1. Scores given to the probability of outbreak (p) using beta(40, 1.5) and beta(41, 0.5) distributions for F1 and F2.
Outbreak No outbreak Outbreak No outbreak
p F1(p) 1 − F2(p) p F1(p) 1 − F2(p)
0.0 0.0 1.0 0.99 0.847 0.635
0.9 0.037 0.997 0.995 0.940 0.477
0.95 0.248 0.959 0.999 0.994 0.225
0.97 0.484 0.885 0.9995 0.998 0.160
0.98 0.653 0.801 1.0 1.0 0.0
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0160759.t001
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We use max[0, (yi − ηi)
1/2], rather than max[0, yi − ηi], so that a few common diseases do not
dominate the overall scores of algorithms.
While the above form of scoring rule is useful for evaluating surveillance methods, it cannot
be applied to weather forecasting because of intrinsic differences between the two contexts.
With surveillance methods a quantity is observed that relates to the magnitude of an outbreak
if an outbreak has occurred, but the question of whether an outbreak has occurred is still of
interest. In weather forecasting this does not happen when, say, the forecast is giving the proba-
bility of rain: if the quantity of rain that has fallen in a day is known, then we know whether
it has rained. Consequently, in weather forecasting other approaches have been proposed to
take the quantity of rainfall into account in evaluating rainfall forecasts [13, 14]. However, the
methods do not give proper scoring rules.
To apply the scoring rule to an algorithm, the algorithm’s value for pi must be calculated for
each week. If there were four or fewer cases of disease in the last four weeks then, by assump-
tion, there is no outbreak in the current week and pi is set equal to 0. Similarly, we set pi equal
to 0 in weeks where the observed count is less than the number the algorithm expects when
there is no outbreak. For other weeks, let Bi denote the event that there is an ongoing outbreak
of the disease under consideration at time ti and let Bci denote the (complementary) event that
there is no outbreak at time ti. To obtain pi, we calculate (i) PðyijBci ;HiÞ, (ii) P(Bi|Hi), and (iii)
P(yi|Bi,Hi), where Hi denotes the historical data available at time ti. Then pi is given by Bayes
theorem,
pi ¼ PðBijyi;HiÞ ¼
PðyijBi;HiÞ  PðBijHiÞ
PðyijBi;HiÞ  PðBijHiÞ þ PðyijBci ;HiÞ  PðBct jHiÞ
: ð8Þ
The outbreak detection algorithms were designed to evaluate the probability that the
count Yi is greater than a threshold value, U, when there is no outbreak. Hence we can obtain
PðY  yijBci ;HiÞ and PðY  yi þ 1jBci ;HiÞ from the algorithm under consideration and, for
(i), equate PðyijBci ;HiÞ to their difference. For (ii), we equate P(Bi|Hi) to the proportion of
weeks in the series that are classiﬁed as ‘extreme’ by the algorithm. It seems prudent to antici-
pate an outbreak in at least one week in twenty years, so we set P(Bi|Hi) equal to 0.001 if it is
less than that value.
Quantity (iii), P(yi|Bi, Hi), is trickier to determine. For each organism, we first identify the
weeks for which the algorithm flags an abberation or outbreak (hence called outbreak-weeks).
If there were more than five outbreak weeks then:
1. For both outbreak and non-outbreak weeks we calculate the standardised count,
SCðyijHiÞ ¼
y2=3i  bm2=3i
fvarðy2=3i  bm2=3i Þg1=2 ; ð9Þ
where yi is the observed count that week and bmi is the (baseline) count predicted by the
algorithm. Both bmi and varðy2=3i  bm2=3i Þ are used in calculating exceedance scores, so
they are readily available from each algorithm.
2. We select the outbreak weeks and fit a log-normal distribution to the standardised counts
of those weeks.
3. For all weeks (except when pi has not been set to 0), we equate P(yi|Bi,Hi) to the difference
between P{ξ SCi(yi)} and P{ξ SCi(yi + 1)}, where ξ is a variable that has the log-normal
distribution fitted in (ii).
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If there were five or fewer outbreak weeks then:
4. Taking just the outbreak weeks, a Poisson distribution is fitted to the counts above base-
line, yi  bmi, with the Poisson parameter equated to a constant (λ) multiplied by the stan-
dard deviation of the baseline count at ti, (ϕμi)
1/2. The maximum likelihood estimate of λ
is bl ¼Piðyi  bmiÞ=PiðbbmiÞ1=2, where the summations cover the outbreak weeks.
5. For all weeks (except when pi = 0), P(yi|Bi, Hi) is equated to the probability of yi  bmi
under a Poisson distribution with mean blðbbmiÞ1=2.
5 Results
There are 2304 diseases for which we have eight years or more of continuous data. Of these dis-
eases, 1345 showed no sequence of four weeks in which there were five or more cases of the dis-
ease and so have no count that is classified as an outbreak by any of the algorithms. Those
diseases are not considered further in our analyses.
The false positive rates for the other 959 diseases are shown in Fig 4. The rates vary greatly
according to the baseline disease count (the values in series A) and were calculated for five
groups: counts of 1–4, 5–14, 15–50, 51–150, and over 150. Fig 4 shows that the false-positive
rate increases substantially as the baseline count increases—clearly large baseline counts make
the identification of outbreaks more problematic, as might be expected. Although the first
group has very low false-positive rates, the rates in this group are important because it is much
the largest group and, in terms of actual numbers rather than rates, there are more false posi-
tives in this group than any other. The number of false-positives in each group are shown in
Fig 5. Comparing algorithms, the false-positive rates (and the number of false-positives) are
typically about twice as high for the HPA algorithm as for the negative binomial and quasi-
Poisson algorithms. The false positive rates for these latter two algorithms are fairly similar,
although the negative-binomial performed a little better than the quasi-Poisson when the
baseline count was small. When groups are combined, the overall false-positive rate was 1.63%
for the HPA algorithm, 0.76% for the negative binomial algorithm and 0.87% for the quasi-
Poisson.
Turning to sensitivity, long outbreaks are easier to detect than short outbreaks, so sensitivity
will vary with outbreak duration. Fig 6 shows the proportion of outbreaks that were detected
by each algorithm, classified by outbreak duration. This proportion is only about 50% for out-
breaks that lasted only one week, increases substantially for those lasting two weeks (the pro-
portion was 70% for the HPA algorithm), and generally continued to increase as the duration
of the outbreak increased. The overall probability of detection was 57% for the HPA algorithm,
51% for the negative binomial and 53% for the quasi-Poisson. There were 233 outbreaks of 7 or
more weeks duration and, for these, the probability of detection was 83%, 83% and 81% for the
HPA, negative-binomial and quasi-Poisson algorithms, respectively.
Fig 7 shows the proportion of outbreaks that were detected by each algorithm, this time clas-
sified by the size of the outbreak. It shows that, for all three algorithms, sensitivity improves
substantially as outbreak size increases from 1-4 cases to 5-9 cases. Thereafter, the level of sen-
sitivity is fairly flat for the HPA algorithm but, somewhat surprisingly, for the other two algo-
rithms it initially declines as outbreak size increases, only increasing again for the category
containing the largest outbreaks. The reason is that, in general, larger outbreaks tend to occur
in diseases that have the larger baseline rates and higher levels of background noise, making an
outbreak more difficult to detect. Values on the ScPOD measure were calculated so as to obtain
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an overall measure of sensitivity that gave greater importance to larger outbreaks. Its value was
70.7% for the HPA algorithm, somewhat better than the values of 67.3% and 67.4% for the
quasi-Poisson and negative-binomial algorithms.
Rather than simply detecting outbreaks, it is important to detect them in a timely fashion.
Fig 8 indicates the weeks that elapsed before an outbreak was detected. We only consider out-
breaks that were at some stage detected, as sensitivity has already been examined (Figs 6 and
7). Indeed, we only consider those outbreaks that were detected by all three algorithms, so that
comparison of the algorithms is fair. The figure shows that outbreaks of less than 10 weeks
duration were detected quickly (assuming they were detected); the delay was less than one
week on average, and was similar for all three algorithms. For the longer outbreaks of 11 weeks
or more, the HPA algorithm had a slightly longer average time before detection (ATBD) of 1.3
weeks, while the ATBD for the other two algorithms were more than a week poorer, at over 2.4
weeks. The relative size before detection (RSBD) is plotted against outbreak duration in Fig 9.
Fig 4. False-positive rates.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0160759.g004
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As the HPA algorithm has a higher sensitivity than the quasi-Poisson and negative binomial
algorithms, it would also be expected to have a better RSBD. The figure clearly shows this is the
case, though differences between the three algorithms are small.
The beta scoring rule was used to make comparisons between algorithms that reflect both
specificity and sensitivity. Table 2 gives the scores for each algorithm. The HPA algorithm has
lower scores than the negative and quasi-Poisson algorithms in weeks without outbreak, but
better scores when there was an outbreak. This is consistent with results presented earlier that
showed the HPA algorithm has poorer specificity than the other two algorithms (Figs 4 and 5)
but better sensitivity (Figs 6 and 7). Overall, the last column of the table shows that the newer
algorithms had better beta (40, 0.5) scores than the HPA algorithm, indicating that they assess
the probability of an outbreak better than the HPA algorithm. The scores of the two newer
algorithms were quite similar for both outbreak and non-outbreak weeks, with the quasi-Pois-
son having slightly the better overall score. This latter result was a surprise—the quasi-Poisson
Fig 5. Number of false-positives by baseline count.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0160759.g005
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algorithm is faster than the negative binomial algorithm but uses approximations that the neg-
ative binomial does not require.
Fig 10 breaks down the scores for weeks with an outbreak according to the size of the out-
break. It can be seen that the relative scores of the different algorithms change little as the out-
break size changes. As was intended, outbreaks of all sizes make a substantial contribution to
the overall scores of the algorithms.
The comparison of algorithms provided by a scoring rule is important. For this reason, the
sensitivity of conclusions to the precise form of the scoring rule should be examined. To this
end, we also evaluated the algorithms using two other forms of the scoring rule:
Scoring rule 2. The scoring rule parameters, a and b, were set equal to 31 and 1.5, so that F1 and
F2 in Eq (7) are the cumulative distribution functions of beta(31, 2.5) and beta(32, 1.5) dis-
tributions, respectively. With this rule, the occurrence of an outbreak gives a higher score
Fig 6. Probability of detection by duration of outbreak.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0160759.g006
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when p exceeds 0.95 and non-occurrence gives a higher score if p is less than 0.95. (The
comparable balance-point for the beta (40, 0.5) scoring rule is 0.985, as noted earlier.)
Scoring rule 3. An unweighted form of the scoring rule in which the gi-weights in Eq (7) are
fixed at unity. (As with the original scoring rule, F1 and F2 are the cumulative distribution
functions of beta(40, 1.5) and beta(41, 0.5) distributions.)
Results for these scoring rules are given in Table 3. It can be seen that with both rules the
quasi-Poisson algorithm is again marginally better than the negative binomial algorithm and
both are noticeably better than the HPA algorithm. Hence the comparison of these algorithms
shows some robustness to the choice of scoring rule.
6 Concluding comments
The study reported here followed the straightforward path of
Fig 7. Probability of detection by size of outbreak.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0160759.g007
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1. constructing realistic series of test data in which it is known where outbreaks had been
injected;
2. selecting/forming suitable evaluation metrics;
3. applying algorithms to the series of test data and comparing their performances using the
evaluation metrics.
The test data were formed from time series of the actual weekly counts of the number of
cases of individual diseases. The series for each disease was separated into a series of baseline
counts (series A) and a series of outbreak counts (series B). The outbreak counts were trans-
lated by twelve months (giving series C) and recombined with A to form a test data series. This
was done for 2304 different diseases, giving test data that reflected the diversity of patterns
found in real data. The critical step in constructing the test data is the separation of the original
series into baseline counts and outbreak counts. A number of methods were tried (not reported
here) and their resulting time series of baseline and outbreak counts for individual diseases
Fig 8. Average time before detection by duration of outbreak.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0160759.g008
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were examined. With the method that was adopted, visual inspection of plots showed that
weeks with/without outbreak appeared to be classified sensibly.
As well as standard metrics, such as sensitivity and specificity, we also used a scoring rule to
evaluate the performances of outbreak surveillance algorithms. Scores were derived from algo-
rithms’ estimates of pij, the realistic probability that an outbreak has occurred in week i for
disease j. Better estimates of pij can simultaneously improve both sensitivity and speciﬁcity;
otherwise sensitivity is normally only improved at the expense of reduced speciﬁcity, or vice-
Fig 9. Relative size before detection by duration of outbreak.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0160759.g009
Table 2. Scores of each algorithm for weeks with an outbreak, without an outbreak, and overall.
Algorithm Weeks with an outbreak Weeks without an outbreak Overall
HPA 49 646 374 200 423 846
Negative binomial 34 730 408 621 443 351
Quasi-Poisson 32 697 411 241 443 938
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0160759.t002
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versa. With the scoring rule we used, the precise value of an estimate only matters when that
value is above 0.9, which mirrors the range of values in which consideration should be given to
ﬂagging an outbreak and/or triggering an alarm. The scoring rule also has the useful property
that larger outbreaks receive greater weight in the overall scores.
The results of our analysis show clearly that the HPA algorithm has slightly better sensitivity
than the algorithms designed to replace it; the value of ScPOD was 70.7% for the HPA algorithm
compared with 67.3% and 67.4% for the quasi-Poisson and negative binomial algorithms.
Fig 10. Scores by size of outbreak.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0160759.g010
Table 3. Overall scores given to algorithms by scoring rules 2 and 3.
Algorithm Weighted beta(31, 1.5) Unweighted beta(40, 0.5)
HPA 406 243 577 600
Negative binomial 439 998 580 560
Quasi-Poisson 441 136 581 274
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0160759.t003
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Consistent with this finding, the HPA algorithm also had a shorter average delay time before
outbreak detection and a smaller relative size before detection. However, the motivation for
replacing the HPA algorithm was to improve specificity—a report on the HPA algorithm identi-
fied a high false positive rate as a limitation to its practical usefulness [2]. In that respect, the two
new algorithms are highly successful; the overall false positive rates for the quasi-Poisson and
negative binomial algorithms were 0.76% and 0.87%, respectively, which are approximately half
the HPA rate of 1.63%. Pragmatically, these large reductions more than compensate for the
slightly poorer sensitivity of the new algorithms. The scoring rule showed that the new algo-
rithms also assess the probability of an outbreak better than the HPA algorithm, which on its
own is reason to prefer them. In all respects the performances of the quasi-Poisson and negative
binomial algorithms were very similar.
The purpose of this study was to compare three specified algorithms and this led to some
limitations. In particular, the approach for generating test data is similar in many ways to the
algorithms being considered. While this does not favour any one of the algorithms over the
other two, it would become important if fundamentally different surveillance algorithms had
to be evaluated for comparative purposes. In that case the mechanism for generating the test
data would favour the HPA, negative binomial and quasi-Poisson algorithms. This could be
avoided by altering Steps 2-4 in the test data generation process: the quasi-Poisson model in
Step 2 might be replaced with a non-parametric smoother and non-parametric estimates of
quantiles could be used in Steps 3 and 4. Another consequence from focusing on these three
algorithms is that only aggregated counts across England andWales were analysed. Local or
small outbreaks that are confined, say, to a village or town will often be overlooked, while some
spatiotemporal surveillance methods, such as SatScan [15], are designed to identify such local
outbreaks. Broad reviews of outbreak surveillance methods are given in [3], [7] and [16].
In this paper, an outbreak has been defined as the addition of any cases to the baseline
count. In practice, not all excesses would be classified as ‘outbreaks’ by subject-matter experts.
Public Health England, for whom the algorithms were developed, use an algorithm to sort
through hundreds of organisms each week and provide a shortlist of potential problems to be
discussed by a team of epidemiologists. Their response to an abnormally high count will
depend on many factors, most notably the disease, the assessed probability of an outbreak, and
the estimated excesses in the current and preceding weeks. A typical response to an outbreak
alert for a food or waterborne pathogen is to trace the source of contamination and remove it.
For pathogens that are transmitted person to person, an outbreak may signal a problem with
vaccine efficacy, or a change in pathogenicity.
The measures that are taken depend on context and some genuine outbreaks are not investi-
gated at all. Hence, although the results from outbreak investigations could, in principle, be
used to evaluate the accuracy of surveillance algorithms, selection biases would be hard to miti-
gate. Also, the results from an investigation are not always clear-cut, as not all investigations of
common source outbreak find the common source and, if an outbreak is declared to be over
(no further incident cases), the investigation will often be terminated without identifying causal
exposure. In addition, some outbreaks are missed, as is clear from work reported in [17], who
applied our negative binomial algorithm retrospectively to a laboratory database to look for
two pathogens. They detected three outbreaks in a one-year period that were not previously
recognised.
The study reported here is one of the most realistic evaluations of disease surveillance sys-
tems to have been conducted. It was possible because of the large reservoir of past data that was
available. The original algorithm (the HPA algorithm) was in operation for over twenty years,
monitoring infectious disease incidence for a population of 57 million, so decisions on its
replacement could not be taken lightly. During the preparation of this paper, Public Health
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England have replaced the HPA algorithm with the negative binomial algorithm, in line with
the findings reported here. As well as monitoring combined disease surveillance data from
England and Wales, the new algorithm has also been applied to individual hospital trusts to
examine time series of cases of important antimicrobial resistant pathogens. Modified forms of
the new algorithms are also in use in the Robert Koch Institute, Berlin [18].
Appendix A
Let {yi, i = 1, 2, . . .} denote the time-series of the number of cases of the disease under consider-
ation, where yi denotes a count in week ti. Let t0 denote the current week. The HPA algorithm
uses quasi-Poisson regression to identify aberrations in the weekly counts. It assumes that yi
follows a linear time trend and is distributed with mean μi and variance ϕμi:
logðmiÞ ¼ yþ bti ð10Þ
where ϕ denotes a parameter that allows for over-dispersion. The following gives details.
1. The algorithm implicitly adjusts for seasonal effects by basing calculation of the expected
count in the current week or just those counts that were observed in comparable weeks in
the past. This approach also moderates the effects of events that occur at regular times each
year, such as Christmas and summer holidays, which can affect when cases of diseases
are reported. If t0 is week τ of the current year, then only data from weeks τ − 3 to τ + 3 of
previous years are used in the analysis. Let t(1),. . ., t(n) denote the weeks that are used and
y(1),. . ., y(n) the corresponding counts.
2. An iterative reweighting procedure is used to estimate model parameters and correct for
past outbreaks in the baseline data. If there is no evidence of a linear time trend at the 5%
significance level, then β is set equal to 0 in Eq (10). At convergence of the procedure, let bmi
denote the estimate of y(i) and let wi be the weight in week t(i) (i = 1,. . ., n). The algorithm’s
estimate of ϕ is
b ¼ max 1
n  r
Xn
i¼1
wi
ðyðiÞ  bm iÞ2bm i ; 1
( )
ð11Þ
where r = 1 or r = 2 depending on whether a time trend has been ﬁtted. The weights satisfy
wi ¼
gs2i if si > 1
g otherwise
ð12Þ
(
where γ is a constant such that
Pn
i¼1 wi ¼ n and the si are scaled Anscombe residuals,
si ¼
3
2b1=2 y
2=3
ðiÞ  bm2=3ibm1=6i ð1 hiiÞ1=2 ; ð13Þ
where hii are the diagonal elements of the hat matrix.
3. Let bm0 ¼ by þ bbt0 denote the expected value of y0, the count for the current week. The algo-
rithm calculates the threshold value, U, from
U ¼ bm0 1þ 23 zabm10 bbm0 þ varðbm0Þ 1=2
 3=2
ð14Þ
where zα is the 100(1 − α)-percentile of the standard normal distribution. Applying a 2/3
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power transformation to a Poisson variate induces an approximately symmetric distribu-
tion, which underlies the 3/2 power in Eq (14).
4. The exceedance score is then given by X ¼ ðy0  bm0Þ=ðU  bm0Þ, as in Eq (1).
The quasi-Poisson and negative-binomial algorithms model seasonality through a 10-level
factor that has a 7-week reference period (corresponding to weeks τ ± 3, as in the HPA algo-
rithm) and nine 5-week periods each year:
logðmiÞ ¼ yþ bti þ dtðtiÞ ð15Þ
where δτ(ti) is the seasonal factor. These algorithms always include a term for linear trend
(never setting β to 0), and only set wi equal to gs2i when si> 2.58, rather than si> 1 (c.f. Eq
(12)). The quasi-Poisson model calculates the threshold value as in Eq (14), while the negative
binomial algorithm calculates it under the assumption that, when there is an outbreak, the
number of cases above baseline in a week follows a negative binomial distribution.
Supporting Information
S1 RCodes. S1_R.Codes.R: An R code used in the implementation of test data and compari-
son of statistical algorithms.
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